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Modularity and compositionality:
The case of temporal modifiers ∗
Philippe de Groote
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Abstract This paper concerns the possibility of building Montague grammars in
a modular and incremental way. As an illustration, we investigate the following
question: Given an atemporal Montague grammar, on the one hand, and a temporal
ontology, on the other hand, is it possible to combine them into a new grammar such
that it would: (i) conservatively extend the original grammar, and (ii) allow temporal
modifiers to be accommodated?
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1 Introduction
One says that a semantics is compositional when it allows the meaning of a complex
expression to be computed from the meaning of its constituents. One also says that a
system is modular if it is made of relatively independent components. In the case
of a semantic system, say a Montague grammar, we will say that it is modular if
the ontology on which it is based (including notions such as truth, entities, events,
possible worlds, time intervals, state of knowledge, state of believe, ...) is obtained
by combining relatively independent simple ontologies.
We believe that modularity is a requirement as important as compositionality.
A large semantic system that is not be modular would be quite difficult to grasp
and present little explanatory power. In addition, modularity plays an essential part
in the incremental development of a semantic system. Typically, in the absence of
modularity, when studying a new semantic phenomenon, it is problematic to decide
whether and how the proposed treatment is compatible with the treatments of other
phenomena.
This paper may be seen as an exercice in developing a modular semantic system.
As a case of study, we consider the temporal modifiers. The question we want to
investigate is then the following. Given an atemporal Montague grammar, on the
one hand, and a temporal ontology, on the other hand, is it possible to combine them
into a new grammar such that it would:
∗ This work has been supported by the French agency Agence Nationale de la Recherche (ANR-
12-CORD-0004).
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i. conservatively extend the original grammar;
ii. allow temporal modifiers to be accommodated.
This question is not as easy as it might seem at first sight. Temporal modifiers,
indeed, may be cascaded, which interacts in a non-trivial way with quantification
and binding. This is illustrated by the following sentence, taken from Pratt &
Francez 2001, where the existentially quantified modifier one Monday determines the
quantification domain of the universally quantified modifier during every meeting:
(1) Mary kissed John during every meeting one Monday.
A classical account of temporal modification has been given by Dowty 1979,
1982. As with most such accounts,1 it is based on an interpretation of sentences as
sets of time intervals,2 which seems unavoidable in order to interpret cascades of
temporal modifiers. Consider, for instance, the following sentence (Dowty 1982):
(2) I first met John Smith at two o’ clock in the afternoon on a Thursday in the
first week of June in 1942.
For such a sentence, where the cascaded temporal modifiers are existentially quanti-
fied, Dowty’s theory makes the correct prediction. This is not the case, however, for
sentences akin to (1), as it was first observed by Pratt & Francez 2001.
In fact, every treatment of quantified temporal prepositional phrases prior to
Pratt & Francez 2001 fails in making correct predictions for sentences akin to (1).3
For this reason, the treatment we are proposing in this paper may be partly seen as a
reengineering of Pratt and Francez’s solution.
Their analysis of example (1) works as follows. The sentence Mary kissed John
is assigned the following meaning:
(3) JMary kissed JohnK= λ i.∃e.(kissedmje)∧ ((τ e)⊂ i),
where i denotes a time interval, e denotes an event, and τ maps an event to the
time interval during which it occurs. In a similar way, the noun meeting is assigned
meaning (4), while the determiner every is assigned its standard meaning:
(4) JmeetingK= λxi.(meetingx)∧ ((τ x)⊂ i),
(5) JeveryK= λ pq.∀x.(px)→ (qx).
Since the interpretation of meeting is a relation between (event-like) entities and time
intervals, applying to it the interpretation of every would result in a type mismatch.
To circumvent this problem, an operation called pseudo-application is defined:
1 In addition to Dowty 1979, 1982, see Pratt & Francez 2001; Francez & Steedman 2006; von Stechow
2002, 2009
2 Or, possibly, sets of pairs of time intervals, as it is the case in Dowty 1982.
3 See Pratt & Francez 2001, for a discussion.
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(6) φ (1ψ)1 = λqi.φ (λx.ψ x i)q.
This allows the meaning of the noun phrase every meeting to be computed as
follows:
(7) Jevery meetingK = JeveryK(1JmeetingK)1
= λqi.JeveryK(λx.JmeetingKx i)q
= λqi.(λ pq.∀x.(px)→ (qx))(λx.JmeetingKx i)q
→ β λqi.∀x.(JmeetingKx i)→ (qx)
→ β λqi.∀x.((meetingx)∧ ((τ x)⊂ i))→ (qx).
As for the preposition during, Pratt and Francez assign it the following interpreta-
tion:
(8) JduringK= λ pqi. p(λx.q(τ x)) i.
Then, by applying (8) to (7), one obtains the interpretation of the prepositional
phrase during every meeting:
(9) Jduring every meetingK= λqi.∀x.((meetingx)∧ ((τ x)⊂ i))→ (q(τ x)).
The meaning of (during) one monday is computed in similar way, which yields the
following result:
(10) J(during) one mondayK= λqi.∃x.(mondayx)∧ ((τ x)⊂ i)∧ (q(τ x)).
Finally, by applying (9) to (3), and then applying (10) to the result, one obtains the
following reading for sentence (1):
(11) λ i.∃x.(mondayx)∧ ((τ x)⊂ i)∧
(∀y.((meetingy)∧ ((τ y)⊂ (τ x)))→
(∃e.(kissedmje)∧ ((τ e)⊂ (τ y)))).
Pratt and Francez’s analysis has certainly the merit of making the right prediction,
in the sense that formula (11) captures the intuitive truth conditions of sentence (1).
Nevertheless, there are some oddities in their solution, which prevent it from being
modular:
i. Their analysis does not rely on any precise notion of syntax-semantics inter-
face. Consequently, the compositional way of computing the meaning of a
sentence is not completely specified.4
ii. Sentences are sometimes interpreted as truth values, sometimes as sets of
time intervals, and even sometimes as relations between events and time
4 This is not a serious objection since Francez & Steedman 2006 recasts the solution in the fully
specified framework of Combinatory Categorial Grammars.
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intervals. In other words, there is no notion of proposition that allows
the sentences to be interpreted in a uniform way. As a consequence, the
compositionality of their semantics relies on non standard operations such as
the so-called pseudo-applications.
iii. The fact that the subinterval relations occurring in formula (11) are not
contributed by the meaning assigned to during goes against the intuition.
As a consequence, the interpretation of during in (8) is rather opaque. (von
Stechow 2002 makes a similar criticism.)
iv. There is no uniform treatment of the temporal prepositions. In particular,
the meaning assigned to prepositions such as before and after relies on quite
ad hoc primitives, the existence of which may appear as a constraint on the
temporal ontology. (Again, von Stechow 2002 makes a similar criticism.)
v. Their solution is bound to event semantics in an essential way. Indeed, the
use of the operator τ is central to their solution. It allows them to quantify
over time intervals by quantifying over events.5
In the rest of this paper, we will try to circumvent all these possible drawbacks.
2 The syntax semantics interface
As explained in the preceding introduction, we intend to sketch a semantic inter-
pretation of temporal prepositional phrases that is both compositional and modular.
To this end, we will stick to a strict Montagovian framework, i.e., we will construct
the semantic interpretation as a homomorphic image of the syntax. We do not want,
however, to commit ourselves to some precise syntactic theory. Accordingly, we
will consider that meanings are computed from abstract syntactic structures that
correspond to plausible logical forms. Technically, these abstract structures (or
logical forms) will be represented as typed λ -terms built upon a given signature.
Consider, for instance, the following sentence:
(12) Every professor kissed a student.
Its logical form is expressed by the following λ -term, which is built upon the
signature given in Table 1:
(13) KISSED (SOME STUDENT)(EVERY PROFESSOR).
5 This will not appear as a problem to those who like to work in a Davidsonian framework, but it may
be seen as quite a constraint by the others.
659
de Groote
JOHN : NP
MARY : NP
PROFESSOR : N
STUDENT : N
MEETING : N
MONDAY : N
SOME : N→ NP
EVERY : N→ NP
KISSED : NP→ NP→ S
Table 1 The signature specifying the abstract syntactic structure
Expression (13) is a purely applicative term that may be seen as a tree. This
is not the general case. Logical forms may possibly involve λ -abstractions. For
instance, we could enrich the signature of Table 1 with the following constant:
QR : NP→ (NP→ S)→ S,
and write the following λ -term:
QR (SOME STUDENT)(λx.KISSED x(EVERY PROFESSOR)),
which would correspond to the object wide-scope reading of sentence (12).
Having specified the source of our semantic interpretation, we must specify its
target. Here we follow an architecture similar to Montague 1973. We assume the
existence of an intermediate language which allows meanings to be expressed as
logical formulas. This object language consists of the simply typed λ -calculus en-
riched with the connectives and quantifiers of first-order logic, and specific relational
symbols (given in their Curryfied form). Table 2 gives a signature that specifies such
relational symbols.
Finally, the semantic interpretation itself is specified by assigning a term of the
object language to each constant of the signature specifying the abstract syntactic
structures. This interpretation must, of course, respect some typing constraints
that ensure that the semantic interpretation of the syntactic categories is consistent.
Table 3, where e∗ stands for (e → t) → t, gives such an interpretation, which
corresponds fairly to a standard Montagovian semantics. It allows the meaning
of a sentence such as (12) to be computed as follows: replace, in the abstract
syntactic structure (13), each constant by its interpretation (as given by Table 3),
then β -normalize the resulting λ -term.
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j : e
m : e
professor : e→ t
student : e→ t
meeting : e→ t
monday : e→ t
kissed : e→ e→ t
Table 2 The signature providing the relational symbols of the object language
JOHN := λk.k j : e∗
MARY := λk.km : e∗
PROFESSOR := λx.professorx : e→ t
STUDENT := λx.studentx : e→ t
MEETING := λx.meetingx : e→ t
MONDAY := λx.mondayx : e→ t
SOME := λ pq.∃x.(px)∧ (qx) : (e→ t)→ e∗
EVERY := λ pq.∀x.(px)→ (qx) : (e→ t)→ e∗
KISSED := λos.s(λx.o(λy.kissedxy)) : e∗→ e∗→ t
Table 3 The semantic interpretation
Table 1, 2, and 3 will be used as a running example in the rest of this paper. They
correspond to our original grammar, i.e., the atemporal Montague grammar that we
want to extend to the end of accommodating temporal modifiers
3 The temporal ontology
In search of a generic treatment of temporal modification, we must impose as
few requirements as possible on the temporal ontology. Basically, we require the
existence of a partial order (I,⊂). The elements of I are thought of as time intervals,
and the binary relation ⊂ as time interval inclusion.
Then, in order to accomodate temporal preposition such as before, after, or
until, one may require some additional structure on I. For instance, we may need
to provide the set of time intervals with a precedence relation, <. Typically, I may
be the set of closed intervals obtained from a linearly ordered set, as it is the case
in standard interval temporal logic (Halpern & Shoham 1991). In such a case, the
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temporal relations under consideration may be the twelve interval relations of Allen
1983. Such a commitment to a given temporal logic, however, is not mandatory.
One may think of I as a set of abstract intervals, provided with some binary relations
obeying some given laws. For instance, one would require both the inclusion and
precedence relations to be partial orders obeying, in addition, the following laws:
(i⊂ j) ↔ ¬(i< j),
(i⊂ j) ↔ ¬( j < i),
((i⊂ j)∧ ( j < k))→ (i< k),
((i< j)∧ (k < j))→ (i< k).
To reflect the existence of the temporal structure at the level of the object
language, we add a new type, i, which will be semantically interpreted as I. This
allows new logical connectives to be defined. Typically, the during-modality is
defined as follows:
(14) 〈D〉φ = λ i.∃ j.( j ⊂ i)∧ (φ j).
Its dual, which will play a part in Section 5, is then defined accordingly:
(15) [D]φ = λ i.∀ j.( j ⊂ i)→ (φ j).
Similarly, one defines the before-modalities as follows:6
(16) 〈B〉φ = λ i.∃ j.( j < i)∧ (φ j),
(17) [B]φ = λ i.∀ j.( j < i)→ (φ j).
4 The temporalization procedure
Having chosen an adequate temporal ontology, the next step is to provide our original
grammar with a temporal dimension. To this end, we take
prop= i→ t
to be type of the propositions, and we applied a systematic temporalization procedure
akin to the intentionalization procedure defined in de Groote & Kanazawa 2013.
De Groote and Kanazawa’s intentionalization procedure provides a systematic
way of turning an extensional semantics into an intensionalized one without chang-
ing the truth conditions of the sentences. It is defined in a higher-order setting.
Instantiating it to the case of first-order logic amounts simply to giving appropriate
translation for the relational symbols and for the logical connectives and quantifiers.
6 In Halpern & Shoham 1991, the “before” modalities are written as 〈L〉 and [L], where L stands for the
“later” relation, and L for its inverse. As for B, it denotes the “begins” relation.
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t_professor : e→ i→ t
t_student : e→ i→ t
t_meeting : e→ i→ t
t_monday : e→ i→ t
t_kissed : e→ e→ i→ t
Table 4 The new object signature
Let us define such a translation, which we will write as [_ ]1. For the relational
symbols, we simply add a temporal parameter to each of them by changing the
object signature. For our running example, this results in the new object signature
given in Table 4.
Each relational symbol is then translated into the new corresponding symbol. For
instance, we have:
[professor]1 = t_professor.
As for the translation of the logical connectives and quantifiers, it is straightforward:
[◦]1 = λabi.(ai)◦ (bi), ◦ ∈ {∧,→},
[Q]1 = λ pi.Q(λx. px i), Q ∈ {∃,∀}.
Finally, the translation is homomorphically extended to the λ -terms:7
[x]1 = x,
[λx. t]1 = λx. [t]1,
[t u]1 = [t]1 [u]1.
Now consider an atemporal modelM0, a temporal modelM1, and a time interval
i0 ∈ I (intuitively the time interval of reference) such that:
M0 |= r t1 · · · tn iff M1 |= t_r t1 · · · tn i0,
for every n-ary relational symbol r. One easily establishes, by a straightforward
induction, that
M0 |= φ iff M1 |= [φ ]1 i0.
Let us use boldface symbols (∧,∃, . . .) to denote the translations of the logical
connectives and quantifiers, let us write [_ ] for [_ ]1, and let us define e∗ to be
7 It should be clear that this allows for the translation of the formulas, which are seen as pure λ -terms.
For instance, the formula ∀x.a[x] ∧ b[x] stands for a λ -term akin to all(λx.and(ax)(bx)).
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JOHN := λk.k j : e∗
MARY := λk.km : e∗
PROFESSOR := λx. [professor]x : e→ prop
STUDENT := λx. [student]x : e→ prop
MEETING := λx. [meeting]x : e→ prop
MONDAY := λx. [monday]x : e→ prop
SOME := λ pq.∃x.(px) ∧ (qx) : (e→ prop)→ e∗
EVERY := λ pq.∀x.(px) → (qx) : (e→ prop)→ e∗
KISSED := λos.s(λx.o(λy. [kissed]xy)) : e∗→ e∗→ prop
Table 5 The new semantic interpretation
(e→ prop)→ prop. Then, applying our temporalization procedure to the original
grammar, we obtain the new semantic interpretation given in Table 5. It is then clear,
at first sight, that this new interpretation is in all respects similar to the original one.
5 Accommodating temporal prepositions
We are now in a position to enrich our original grammar with temporal items.
Consider the preposition during. At the level of the abstract syntactic structures, it
gives rise to the following typed constant:
(18) DURING : NP→ S→ S.
In temporal logic, b during a is expressed as a∧〈D〉b. This suggests the following
semantic interpretation:
(19) DURING := λns.n(λx.〈D〉s) : e∗→ prop→ prop.
Let us now use interpretation (19) to compute the semantic interpretation of the
following examples:
(20) Mary kissed John during some meeting.
(21) Mary kissed John during some meeting one Monday.
(22) Mary kissed John during every meeting.
(23) Mary kissed John during every meeting one Monday.
The interpretation of example (20), which is computed as follows, produces the
expected reading:
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DURING (SOME MEETING)(KISSED JOHN MARY)
→ β ∃x.([meeting]x) ∧ 〈D〉([kissed]mj)
→ β λ i.∃x.(t_meetingx i)∧ (∃ j.( j ⊂ i)∧ (t_kissedmj j)).
The interpretation of example (21), which is computed in a similar way, illustrates
how our system accounts for cascades of temporal modifiers:
DURING (SOME MONDAY)(DURING (SOME MEETING)(KISSED JOHN MARY))
→ β ∃x.([monday]x) ∧ 〈D〉(∃y.([meeting]y) ∧ 〈D〉([kissed]mj))
→ β λ i.∃x.(t_mondayx i)∧
(∃ j.( j ⊂ i)∧ (∃y.(t_meetingy j)∧ (∃k.(k ⊂ j)∧ (t_kissedmjk)))).
Example (22), which involves a universal quantification, is more interesting. Com-
puting its interpretation yields a reading that may seem odd at first sight:
DURING (EVERY MEETING)(KISSED JOHN MARY)
→ β ∀x.([meeting]x) → 〈D〉([kissed]mj)
→ β λ i.∀x.(t_meetingx i)→ (∃ j.( j ⊂ i)∧ (t_kissedmj j)).
In fact, the above formula captures correctly the intuitive truth conditions of sen-
tence (22) if we interpret it under a universal closure.
This need for a universal closure explains why our system (in its current state)
fails in making a correct prediction in the case of sentence (23). Indeed, the following
computation yields a reading which is clearly wrong:8
DURING (SOME MONDAY)(DURING (EVERY MEETING)(KISSED JOHN MARY))
→ β ∃x.([monday]x) ∧ 〈D〉(∀y.([meeting]y) → 〈D〉([kissed]mj))
→ β λ i.∃x.(t_mondayx i)∧
(∃ j.( j ⊂ i)∧ (∀y.(t_meetingy j)→ (∃k.(k ⊂ j)∧ (t_kissedmjk)))).
In fact, the above formula (as it appears on the second line of the computation)
would correctly capture the truth conditions of sentence (23) if the first occurrence of
〈D〉 was replaced by [D]. This means that, according to the quantificational context,
during must sometimes be interpreted as λns.n(λx. [D]s). Knowing when one
should use one modality or the other (i.e., 〈D〉 or [D]) can be easily computed with a
simple polarity calculus that we may incorporate in our type discipline. To this end,
we replace the signature given in Table 1 by the one given in Table 6. The semantic
interpretation of the new polarized items is then as given by Table 7.
8 This wrong reading is reminiscent of the one that would be obtained if one would use the semantic
interpretation given by Dowty 1982.
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JOHN : NP
MARY : NP
PROFESSOR : N
STUDENT : N
MEETING : N
MONDAY : N
SOME : N→ NP
SOME+ : N→ NP+
EVERY : N→ NP
EVERY− : N→ NP−
KISSED : NP→ NP→ S+
DURING++ : NP+→ S+→ S+
DURING+− : NP+→ S−→ S+
DURING−+ : NP−→ S+→ S−
DURING−− : NP−→ S−→ S−
Table 6 The polarized signature
The use of polarized items constrains the logical form of sentence (23) to be the
following:
DURING+−(SOME+ MONDAY)(DURING−+(EVERY−MEETING)(KISSED JOHN MARY)).
Then, computing the semantic interpretation of sentence (23) from the preceding
logical form yields the expected result:
DURING+−(SOME+ MONDAY)(DURING−+(EVERY−MEETING)(KISSED JOHN MARY))
→ β ∃x.([monday]x) ∧ [D](∀y.([meeting]y) → 〈D〉([kissed]mj))
→ β λ i.∃x.(t_mondayx i)∧
(∀ j.( j ⊂ i)→ (∀y.(t_meetingy j)→ (∃k.(k ⊂ j)∧ (t_kissedmjk)))).
6 Adding a deictic dimension
Our analysis of the preposition during suggests that a similar treatment may be
applied to other temporal prepositions. In the case of the preposition before, it would
666
Modularity and compositionality
SOME+ := λ pq.∃x.(px) ∧ (qx) : (e→ prop)→ e∗
EVERY− := λ pq.∀x.(px) → (qx) : (e→ prop)→ e∗
DURING++ := λns.n(λx.〈D〉s) : e∗→ prop→ prop
DURING+− := λns.n(λx. [D]s) : e∗→ prop→ prop
DURING−+ := λns.n(λx.〈D〉s) : e∗→ prop→ prop
DURING−− := λns.n(λx. [D]s) : e∗→ prop→ prop
Table 7 Semantic interpretation of the polarized items
amount to enrich our system with the following items:
BEFORE++ := λns.n(λx.〈B〉s) : e∗→ prop→ prop,
BEFORE+− := λns.n(λx. [B]s) : e∗→ prop→ prop,
BEFORE−+ := λns.n(λx.〈B〉s) : e∗→ prop→ prop,
BEFORE−− := λns.n(λx. [B]s) : e∗→ prop→ prop.
Let us use these new items to compute the semantic interpretation of the following
sentence:
(24) Mary kissed John before some meeting one Monday.
This yields the following result:
DURING++(SOME+ MONDAY)(BEFORE++(SOME+ MEETING)(KISSED JOHN MARY))
→ β ∃x.([monday]x) ∧ 〈D〉(∃y.([meeting]y) ∧ 〈B〉([kissed]mj))
→ β λ i.∃x.(t_mondayx i)∧
(∃ j.( j ⊂ i)∧ (∃y.(t_meetingy j)∧ (∃k.(k < j)∧ (t_kissedmjk)))).
The above formula does not completely capture the meaning of sentence (24). It
correctly predicts that there is a monday during which some meeting takes place. It
also predicts that there is some kissing event that happens before the meeting. But it
does not predict that the kissing event happens on that monday.
To circumvent this problem, we must provide our interpretation with an addi-
tional temporal dimension. This new parameter must be thought of as an implicit
indexical that refers to some contextual interval of time, as in Partee’s famous
example:
(25) I didn’t turn off the stove. (Partee 1973)
Adding this new dimension to our system follows a systematic procedure akin
to the temporalization procedure of Section 4. The unary relational symbols are
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systematically transformed as follows:
[professor]2 = λxi j.( j ⊂ i)∧ ([professor]1 x j).
The binary symbols are transformed in a similar way:
[kissed]2 = λxyi j.( j ⊂ i)∧ ([kissed]1 xy j).
As for the logical connectives and quantifiers, their new interpretation is obtained by
applying twice the transformation of Section 4:
[◦]2 = [[◦]1]1, ◦ ∈ {∧,→},
[Q]2 = [[Q]1]1, Q ∈ {∃,∀}.
Spelling it out, it gives the following new interpretation of disjunction:
[∧]2 = λabi j.(ai j)∧ (bi j).
Writing prop for i→ i→ t, using boldface symbols to denote the new interpre-
tations of the logical connectives and quantifiers, and writing [_ ] for [_ ]2, the new
semantic interpretation of our original grammar is still given by Table 5.
It remains to give the new interpretations of the temporal prepositions. To this
end, we first adapt the definition of the temporal modalities to the two-dimensional
setting:
〈D〉φ = λ i j.∃k.(k ⊂ j)∧ (φ i k),
[D]φ = λ i j.∀k.(k ⊂ j)→ (φ i k),
〈B〉φ = λ i j.∃k.(k < j)∧ (φ i k),
[B]φ = λ i j.∀k.(k < j)→ (φ i k).
We then define an operator that allows the deictic temporal parameter to be instanti-
ated with the current time interval:
↓φ = λ i j.φ j j.
The semantic interpretation of the temporal prepositions is then defined as in Table 8.
Finally, let us check that our new two-dimensional interpretation allows one to
compute the correct interpretation of sentence (24):
DURING++(SOME+ MONDAY)(BEFORE++(SOME+ MEETING)(KISSED JOHN MARY))
→ β ∃x.([monday]x) ∧ ↓〈D〉(∃y.([meeting]y) ∧ 〈B〉([kissed]mj))
→ β λ i j.∃x.( j ⊂ i)∧ (t_mondayx j)∧
(↓(λ i j.∃k.(k ⊂ j)∧ (∃y.(k ⊂ i)∧ (t_meetingyk)∧
(∃l.(l < k)∧ (l ⊂ i)∧ (t_kissedmk l)))) i j)
668
Modularity and compositionality
DURING++ := λns.n(λx.↓〈D〉s) : e∗→ prop→ prop
DURING+− := λns.n(λx.↓ [D]s) : e∗→ prop→ prop
DURING−+ := λns.n(λx.↓〈D〉s) : e∗→ prop→ prop
DURING−− := λns.n(λx.↓ [D]s) : e∗→ prop→ prop
BEFORE++ := λns.n(λx.〈B〉s) : e∗→ prop→ prop
BEFORE+− := λns.n(λx. [B]s) : e∗→ prop→ prop
BEFORE−+ := λns.n(λx.〈B〉s) : e∗→ prop→ prop
BEFORE−− := λns.n(λx. [B]s) : e∗→ prop→ prop
Table 8 The two-dimensional interpretation of the temporal prepositions
→ β λ i j.∃x.( j ⊂ i)∧ (t_mondayx j)∧
(∃k.(k ⊂ j)∧ (∃y.(k ⊂ j)∧ (t_meetingyk)∧
(∃l.(l < k)∧ (l ⊂ j)∧ (t_kissedmk l))))
≡ λ i j.∃x.( j ⊂ i)∧ (t_mondayx j)∧
(∃k.(k ⊂ j)∧ (∃y.(t_meetingyk)∧
(∃l.(l < k)∧ (l ⊂ j)∧ (t_kissedmk l)))).
7 Pratt and Francez’s solution revisited
The polarized system we have developed in the two preceding sections could be
adapted in order to cope with generalized quantifiers that are monotone (upward
or downward) in their first argument. We do not know, however, how to adapt it in
order to handle generalized quantifiers that do not satisfy this monotonicity property
(such as most, for instance). This is a drawback with respect to Pratt and Francez’s
system. In order to circumvent it, let us try to recast Pratt and Francez’s analysis in
our setting.
Using our notations, the semantic interpretation that Pratt & Francez 2001 assign
to the noun meeting is the following:
(26) MEETING := λxi.(meetingx)∧ ((τ x)⊂ i).
Then, in order to avoid the use of the operator τ , (26) may be rewritten as (27), or
equivalently as (28):
(27) MEETING := λxi.∃ j.(t_meetingx j)∧ ( j ⊂ i),
(28) MEETING := λx.〈D〉([meeting]1 x).
Now, the problem with a universally quantified prepositional phrase such as
during every meeting is that the existential quantifier occurring in (27) must be
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turned into a universal quantifier that takes scope over the complete sentence. This
is, in fact, reminiscent of donkey sentences. For this reason, we will apply to our
original grammar a continuation-based transformation inspired by the dynamic logic
developed in de Groote 2006 and Lebedeva 2012.9
Roughly speaking, this transformation adds a conjunctive continuation to each
atomic formula. In the case of a standard unary predicate symbol, it is indeed defined
as follows:
[professor]3 = λxc.([professor]1 x) [∧]1 c.
In the case of a unary predicate symbol whose argument is an event-like entity (or in
the case of a predicate corresponding to a non-transitive verb), the transformation is
defined in such a way that it reflects an interpretation akin to (28):
[meeting]3 = λxc.〈D〉(([meeting]1 x) [∧]1 c).
In the case of a binary predicate symbol corresponding to a transitive verb, the
transformation is defined in a similar way:
[kissed]3 = λxyc.〈D〉(([kissed]1 xy) [∧]1 c).
Let STOP = λ i. true be the empty continuation. Negation, conjunction, and existen-
tial quantification are defined as follows:
[¬]3 = λac.([¬]1(a STOP)) [∧]1 c,
[∧]3 = λabc.a(bc),
[∃]3 = λ pc. [∃]1 (λx. pxc).
Finally, implication and universal quantification are defined using de Morgan’s laws:
[→]3 = λab. [¬]3 (a [∧]3 ([¬]3 b)),
[∀]3 = λ p. [¬]3 ([∃]3 (λx. [¬]3 (px))).
In this new setting, the type of the propositions is the following:
prop= (i→ t)→ (i→ t).
Then, mutatis mutandis, the new semantic interpretation of our original grammar is
still given by Table 5.
It remains to give the new semantic interpretation of during. It is simply defined
as follows:
9 As a matter of fact, the transformation we are using corresponds exactly to the dynamicization
transformation of Kobele 2015.
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(29) DURING := λns.n(λx.s) : e∗→ prop→ prop.
We may now check that this new system makes the right prediction for sen-
tence (1) :
DURING (SOME MONDAY)(DURING (EVERY MEETING)(KISSED JOHN MARY))
→ β ∃x.([monday]x) ∧ (∀y.([meeting]y) → ([kissed]mj))
→ β λc. [∃]1x.〈D〉(([monday]1 x)
[∧]1([∀]1y. [D] (([meeting]1 y) [→]1〈D〉([kissed]1 mj)))
[∧]1 c)
→ β λci.∃x j.( j ⊂ i)
∧ (t_mondayx j)
∧ (∀yk.(k ⊂ j)→ ((t_meetingyk)
→ ((∃l.(l ⊂ k)∧ (t_kissedmj l)))))
∧ (c j).
8 Putting everything together
Up to now, we have developed two different systems: a polarity-based system
(Section 5 and 6), and a continuation-based system (Section 7). On the one hand,
the polarity-based system offers a uniform treatment of the temporal propositions.
Unfortunately, it seems that the polarity calculus on which this system is based does
not permit a treatment of all the generalized quantifiers. On the other hand, the
continuation-based system, which is derived from Pratt and Francez’s solution, could
cope with all the generalized quantifiers, but does not permit a uniform treatment of
the temporal propositions. In this section, we will merge our two systems in order to
combine their respective advantages.
Consider the semantic interpretation that the continuation-based system assigns
to the noun meeting:
(30) [meeting]3 = λxc.〈D〉(([meeting]1 x) [∧]1 c).
This interpretation (as well as the interpretations of other lexical items such as verbs)
contains the during-modality. For this reason, as in Pratt and Francez’s system,
the interpretation of the preposition during is rather opaque. In fact, it is a pure
combinator – see (29). A possible way out of this problem is to replace the modality
occurring in (30) by a parameter. This would give rise to the following interpretation
(in the case of a two-dimensional system):
(31) λx f c. f (([meeting]2 x) [∧]2 c).
In order to exploit this idea, let us work out the type of expression (31). Let
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T = i→ i→ t be the type of a two-dimensional temporal proposition. We have
that ([meeting]2 x) [∧]2 c is of type T, and so is c. Consequently, f must be of type
(T→ T), and the complete expression is of type e→ (T→ T)→ T→ T. This leads
us to define the type of the propositions as follows:
prop= (T→ T)→ T→ T.
Now, in order to define a logic acting on propositions of the above type, the first
step is to adapt the dynamic logic of Section 7 to the two-dimensional framework. Let
STOP = λ i j. true be the two-dimensional empty continuation. The two-dimensional
dynamic logic operators are defined as follows:
[¬]4 = λac.([¬]2(a STOP)) [∧]2 c,
[∧]4 = λabc.a(bc),
[∃]4 = λ pc. [∃]2 (λx. pxc).
We are now in a position of defining our ultimate transformation. The transfor-
mation of a predicate symbol whose argument is an event-like entity conforms with
expression (31), and so is the transformation of a predicate symbol corresponding to
a verb:
[meeting]5 = λx f c. f (([meeting]2 x) [∧]2 c),
[kissed]5 = λxy f c. f (([kissed]2 xy) [∧]2 c).
Concerning the predicate symbols whose argument is not an event-like entity, their
transformation is as follows:
[professor]5 = λx f c.([professor]2 x [∧]2 c).
Finally, let ID = λx.x be the identity. The transformation of the logical connectives
and quantifiers is defined as follows:
[¬]5 = λa f . [¬]4 (a f ),
[∧]5 = λab f .(a f ) [∧]4 (b ID),
[∃]5 = λ p f . [∃]4 (λx. px f ),
[→]5 = λab. [¬]5 (a [∧]5 ([¬]5 b)),
[∀]5 = λ p. [¬]5 ([∃]5 (λx. [¬]5 (px))).
Using our usual notational conventions (i.e., writing [_ ] for [_ ]5, and using
boldface symbols to denote the new interpretation of the logical symbols), the
ultimate interpretation of our original grammar is still given by Table 5. Moreover, it
would not be too difficult to establish, for this ultimate interpretation, a conservativity
property similar to the one we have sketched in Section 4.
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We may now give the new interpretation of the temporal prepositions, which will
be responsible for instantiating the parameter f with the appropriate modality. Their
definitions are as follows:
DURING := λns.n(λx f .s(λa.↓〈D〉a)) : e∗→ prop→ prop,
BEFORE := λns.n(λx f .s(λa.〈B〉a)) : e∗→ prop→ prop.
To conclude, let us see how this last system works in the case of sentence (24).
Let us first compute the interpretation of Mary kissed John before some meeting:
BEFORE (SOME MEETING)(KISSED JOHN MARY)
→ β ∃y.([meeting]y) ∧ (λ f . [kissed]mj(λa.〈B〉a))
→ β ∃y.([meeting]y) ∧ (λ f .(λ f c. f (([kissed]2 mj) [∧]2 c))(λa.〈B〉a))
→ β ∃y.([meeting]y) ∧ (λ f c.〈B〉(([kissed]2 mj) [∧]2 c))
→ β ∃y.λ f .([meeting]y f ) [∧]4 ((λ f c.〈B〉(([kissed]2 mj) [∧]2 c)) ID)
→ β ∃y.λ f .(λc. f (([meeting]2 y) [∧]2 c)) [∧]4 (λc.〈B〉(([kissed]2 mj) [∧]2 c))
→ β ∃y.λ f c. f (([meeting]2 y) [∧]2 〈B〉(([kissed]2 mj) [∧]2 c))
→ β λ f . [∃]4 y.λc. f (([meeting]2 y) [∧]2 〈B〉(([kissed]2 mj) [∧]2 c))
→ β λ f c. [∃]2 y. f (([meeting]2 y) [∧]2 〈B〉(([kissed]2 mj) [∧]2 c)).
Let us call the above λ -term S0. The expression corresponding to sentence (24) may
be reduced in a similar way:
DURING (SOME MONDAY)(BEFORE (SOME MEETING)(KISSED JOHN MARY))
→ β λ f c. [∃]2 x. f (([monday]2 x) [∧]2 ↓〈D〉(S0 ID c)).
Let us call this second λ -term S1. In order to obtain a final reading, we may apply it
to the identity and to the empty continuation:
S1 ID STOP
→ β [∃]2 x. ID (([monday]2 x) [∧]2 ↓〈D〉(S0 ID STOP))
→ β [∃]2 x. [monday]2 x [∧]2 ↓〈D〉([∃]2 y.([meeting]2 y) [∧]2 〈B〉(([kissed]2 mj))).
Then, the reduction continues as in the two-dimensional system of Section 6.
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